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 In our daily life, the disagreements between different people does not lack. 
Because of different levels of intellectual, cultural traditions, the impact of the living 
environment, different people, sometimes form a vastly different view. And even the 
same level of intelligence of people in the same cultural traditions and environment, 
people who  face the same question, often form something of view disagreements. 
 A similar situation appears more often in the field of politics and philosophy. In a 
way, the problem of the cognitive disagreements was concerned initially in the field of 
moral philosophy, especially in the field of meta-ethics. For example, if we agree the 
existence of universal values, moral values in pluralistic conflict, one of which is 
correct, and the other are error multi-party, how should it deal with and resolve this 
diverse situation becomes an important issues that ethicists must be taken seriously. 
As a result, problems have emerged. People who are similar in cognitive ability can 
have the same evidence by contending to reach consensus, in this case if the two sides 
or parties still have differences, how we should do? Therefore, the solution of the 
cognitive dissonance will bring us at least the following two meanings: First, we 
need ,at the normative level, given the specification of how when people are faced 
with cognitive disagreements cognitive operations. Only to establish such a cognitive 
specification, can we give a provide defense to some of their own cognitive appraisal 
(beliefs); Second, as noted above, to deal with the problem of cognitive dissonance, 
will give a program to provide a solution.  
    The purpose of this paper is by the application of the ―analysis of knowledge 
"approach, trying to make a comprehensive and systematic study on the issue of 
cognitive disagreements. Overall, at a starting point of the model of cognitive 
dissonance, and in the core of "how a cognitive disagreements can be?", I discuss a 
series of questions about the model, the elements and structure of cognitive 














analysis and comparison of different cognitive models to clarify the model of two 
inter-related cognitive disagreements; By the analysis on the elements of cognitive 
disagreements , including evidence, beliefs, and cognitive peers, I try to clarify their 
Connotations, conditions and rationalities, Which is needed to clarify the role and 
status of these elements in the cognitive differences. Through the respective analysis 
of principle, connotations and the specific mode of operation entailed in the Equal 
Weight view, the Hole Evidence view and the Justification view, I point out the 
contradictions and problems inherent in these programs as well as the relationship 
between them , and then try to determine the principle and its operational mechanism 
which should be followed to deal with cognitive disagreements. These can be seen as 
the main part of this study, and that is the specification of cognitive disagreements.  
    It describes the a range of issues that when there is cognitive disagreements, 
cognitive subject should give what kind of cognitive status to a cognitive peer, how to 
treat the differences in belief revision, and how to properly handle relationship 
between evidence and belief. Only under the conditions that follow these 
specifications may be cognitive have a correct recognition and response. Finally, on 
the summary of the above, I attempt to portray a new model of cognitive 
disagreements. This model not only depicts the basic appearance of the phenomenon 
of cognitive disagreements, but also to provide a reasonable specification and 
direction for our response to it, and on this basis, and give the basic principles and 
programs of dealing with cognitive disagreements. It depicts cognitive disagreements 
as a reasonable to program which entails face differences – feedback of evidence - to 
respond to differences, and can provide a reasonable structure of evidence - belief, so 
as to provide a reasonable the specification for evidence supporting. In this way, we 
can reach a consensus in a maximum limit, and at the same time, leave a reasonable 
space for some of our disagreements.  
    Finally, I draw the basic conclusion: Cognitive dissonance as a particular 
problem appears in a wider vision which is the consensus of our common 
understanding. Believes comes from but higher than the evidences. The former has 















evidence and belief is not a simple decision –attachment, by contrary，there is a 
triangular relationship of the cognitive subjects- evidence – believes. This relationship 
is reflected not only by a causal relationship between evidence and belief, but also by 
the social relations in the cognitive subjects. Under these multiple relationships which 
actions mutually, the cognitive subjects‘ believes show more objective than multiple. 
Consequently, the response to the cognitive disagreement always tend to the 
consensus, and essentially, it‘s goal is to seek "true", which reflects a possible choice 
between the differences and consensus. This constitutes an alternative space between 
the disagreement and the consensus.  
 My paper is the first paper that I see in our country to completely analyze and 
elaborate the knowledge of cognitive disagreement. On this basis, I try to put forward 
a new program to deal with cognitive disagreement, and that may be the main 
innovation of this paper. 
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